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O'Connor: The Third Circuit Searches for an "Economic Reality" in Verma V.

2020]
THE THIRD CIRCUIT SEARCHES FOR AN “ECONOMIC REALITY”
IN VERMA v. 3001 CASTOR

“The employee/independent contractor distinction is not a
bright line but a spectrum, and . . . courts must struggle with matters of degree rather than issue categorical pronouncements.”1

INTRODUCTION
A landmark moment in federal labor and employment law occurred
when Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).2 Since its
enactment over eight decades ago, the FLSA has evolved and expanded
considerably.3 In its current state, the Act functions as both a sword and
shield for employees by including various protections against unfair labor
practices by employers, while also establishing grounds for challenging
possible violations.4 The FLSA not only guarantees rights such as a federal
minimum wage, overtime pay, and break time, but it has also been
amended to include prohibitions against unequal pay, discrimination, and
1. McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016).
2. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2018); see also Jonathan
Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for Minimum Wage,
101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978) (referring to FLSA as “a landmark law for
Nation’s social and economic development”). Before signing the bill, President
Roosevelt declared that, “[e]xcept perhaps for the Social Security Act, it is the
most far-reaching, the most far-sighted program for the benefit of workers ever
adopted.” Grossman, supra, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism (June 24, 1938), in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 392 (2005)).
3. LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE AND
PRACTICE § 1.5, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2020) (“Since the initial passage
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Congress has amended the FLSA 29 times
as of 1991.” (footnote omitted)); see also Wage and Hour Division, History: Wage and
Hour Division Historical Summary, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
whd/about/history [https://perma.cc/5LBU-6WFC] (last visited May 4, 2020)
(listing expansions of federal labor law with amendments to FLSA since its enactment). Some of the most notable amendments to the FLSA include the Equal Pay
Act, which prohibited wage discrimination based on sex, the 1966 amendments,
which included state and local government workers in the Act, and the repeated
amendments increasing the federal minimum wage. See SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra.
4. See generally Judicial Questions Regarding Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage
and Hour Act) and State Acts in Conformity Therewith, 132 A.L.R. 1443 (1941) [hereinafter Judicial Questions] (compiling cases brought under the FLSA showing wide
array of Act’s functionality); see also Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., 35 F. Supp.
1015, 1017 (E.D. Va. 1940) (“[The FLSA] was designed to protect the laboring
public generally against the practices which it outlaws . . . .”).

(903)
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the failure to keep records as an employer.5 Importantly, these various
rights and privileges are only granted to “employees,” which is not explicitly defined within the Act.6 Under Sections 203(e)(1) and 203(g) of the
FLSA, the term “employee” includes “any invidual employed by an employer,” and the term “employ” includes individuals who “suffer or permit
to work” for an employer.7 Though facially broad and seemingly all-inclusive, this statutory definition does not cover all working people.8 For instance, the Supreme Court has historically distinguished independent
contractors from the definition of “employee”; it defines “employees” as
workers who may take part in production or distribution, but take sole
responsibilities for the wages and hours of their own employees.9
To an unsuspecting worker, this distinction may seem mundane; but
the designation is vitally important for would-be employees hoping to benefit from FLSA protections previously mentioned, as well as protections
under other statutes.10 Employers, on the other hand, may be motivated
to treat their workers as “independent contractors” for legal purposes to
5. Wage and Hour Division, Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa [https://perma.cc/5F9S-Y5K5]
(last visited May 4, 2020) (listing rights and protections under the Act).
6. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947)
(“[T]here is in the Fair Labor Standards Act no definition that solves problems as
to the limits of the employer–employee relationship under the Act. Provisions
which have some bearing appear in the margin. The definition of ‘employ’ is
broad . . . . We have decided that it is not so broad as to include those ‘who,
without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their
own advantage on the premises of another.’” (citation omitted)).
7. Employer is defined within Section 203(d) as:
[A]ny person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not
include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer)
or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018).
8. See § 213 (enumerating types of workers not covered under FLSA); see also
§ 203(e)(2)–(4) (clarifying certain individuals who do not qualify as employee for
purposes of act).
9. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 729 (listing precedent on issue of independent contractors under FLSA); see also Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330
U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (“The definitions of ‘employ’ and ‘employee’ . . . cannot be
interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own interest an
employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction.”).
10. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 728–29 (concluding unsuspecting
workers deserve protection from employers seeking to label employees as independent contractors); see also Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing
Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 569
(1996) (“In addition, misclassified workers have no access to federally-mandated
benefits and standards, including unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation,
pension regulation through ERISA, health and safety standards, antidiscrimination
laws, federal disability insurance, and protection under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).”).
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avoid significant costs in the form of wages or other benefits.11 These
competing interests have resulted in countless courtroom battles, one of
which the Third Circuit recently decided in Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc.12
The matter involved a class of adult entertainment club dancers that sued
the club owner under the FLSA for unpaid minimum wages and overtime
compensation.13 The club owner considered the dancers as “independent
contractors,” rather than “employees,” and did not pay them any wages or
overtime.14 The dancers tasked the court with deciding whether the club
owner properly classified them as independent contractors.15 The court
remarked that, despite the binary nature of this judgment, “the employee/
independent contractor distinction is not a bright-line rule but a spectrum.”16 The court conducted a holistic assessment of the working relationship between the two parties to determine where exactly dancers at an
adult entertainment club fall on the “spectrum” of employment.17
This Casebrief will address the Third Circuit’s most recent attempt at
making the difficult, fact-based distinction between independent contractors and employees in Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc. The court correctly applied the well-established “economic realities” test, simplifying the
complex relationship between the dancers and the club, and reached arguably the most equitable resolution available. The reasoning in this
court’s opinion, however, exposed the detrimentally unpredictable nature
of the economic realities test.18 This uncertainty stems from the FLSA’s
failure to clearly define the differences between an employee and an independent contractor.19 The judiciary has attempted to bridge the statutory
11. Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New
Again, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 560–61 (2019) (commenting on business’ rationale for contractor–employee distinction).
12. 937 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2019); see generally Judicial Questions, supra note 4
(noting cases where distinction was at issue).
13. Verma, 937 F.3d at 225 (bringing claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a),
207(a), 216(b), and analogous state laws under Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
(PMWA)).
14. Id. at 229 (referencing Castor’s act of requiring dancers to sign agreement
stating they were “independent contractors”).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016)).
17. Id. (“As the economy evolves, courts continue to grapple with the challenge of placing novel economic relations on the correct point in the spectrum. In
many cases that judgment is difficult, and we express sympathy for the district
judges making these fact-intensive judgments under such a flexible standard.”).
18. See supra Part II for further discussion of the court’s holding and analysis.
19. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 295, 296 (2001)
(“Employment laws by their very terms depend on the identification of an employee and an employment relationship. However, these laws are frequently baffling in defining who is an ‘employee’ or what constitutes ‘employment.’ A typical
example is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which defines ‘employee’ as ‘any
individual employed by an employer.’” (footnote omitted)).
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gap between employees and independent contractors over time with the
economic realities test’s six-factor balancing analysis. Despite these efforts, this glaring gap in one of the premiere statutes in federal labor and
employment law harms employers, employees, and independent contractors by drawing a veil of uncertainty over various working relationships.
Verma illuminates problems resulting from vagueness in the FLSA, including (1) employees’ unawareness of their rights under the Act; and (2) risks
to businesses in the form of harsh penalties for unintentionally misclassifying works. Congress should address these issues because the judiciary is illequipped to develop its own test that consistently and fairly differentiates
between complex employment relationships while also fulfilling the intent
of the FLSA.20
I.

BACKGROUND

Federal law largely dictates both the rights and responsibilities of employers and their workforce. Under the FLSA, workers who are considered employees are entitled to benefits including a federal minimum wage
and overtime pay.21 Independent contractors are not employees for the
purposes of the FLSA; therefore, the Act does not statutorily grant these
various benefits.22 Employers are often motivated to avoid the requirements because they are so costly.23 Some employers have even targeted
the independent contractor exemption by intentionally misclassifying
their workforce as independent contractors, even if they are more accurately described as employees.24 These designation battles have led to the
development of the economic realities test, which most courts have
adopted by to reach an accurate resolution.25
The Supreme Court in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb 26 originally set
forth the prototype for the economic realities test, but the Court described
20. See id. at 298–99 (noting that although it has generally been left to the
courts to determine employment relationships, they have failed to do so clearly or
consistently).
21. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2018).
22. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947);
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
23. Griffith, supra note 11, at 560–61 (explaining employers’ incentives to
misclassify workers for legal purposes).
24. See, e.g., Jeff Berman, FedEx to Settle Driver Misclassification Lawsuit for $240
Million, LOGISTICS MGMT. (June 17, 2016), https://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/fedex_to_settle_driver_misclassification_lawsuit_for_240_million [https://
perma.cc/NS4X-BNPC].
25. Middleton, supra note 10, at 577 (“Courts have long considered the economic dependence of the worker on the employer as the key concept in determining a worker’s status as an employee for purposes of the FLSA and have evaluated
each of the factors of the traditional common-law employee/independent contractor test in that light. This test has come to be known as the ‘economic realities’
test.” (footnote omitted)).
26. 331 U.S. 722 (1947)
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the test primarily in dicta.27 The Court explained that “the determination
of the relationship does not depend on such isolated factors but rather
upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”28 The Ninth Circuit refined the Supreme Court’s analysis into a more formalized balancing test
in Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc.29 Now recognized as the economic realities test, the Ninth Circuit identified six specific factors to
weigh in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors:
(1) [T]he degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the
manner in which the work is to be performed;
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
(3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers;
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
(5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.30
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Department of Labor have officially recognized any singular test or rule for making the determination,
but both have acknowledged variations of the economic realities test as a
means of analyzing a working relationship.31 No single factor is dispositive; rather, courts must consider and weigh all factors against each other
in reaching a conclusion.32
The Third Circuit first adopted the economic realities test in Donovan
v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.33 The Third Circuit identified the applicable
law as the “Sureway Cleaners Test”—the Ninth Circuit’s further refined
version of the factors originally set forth in Real v. Driscoll Strawberry.34 The
27. See id. at 730.
28. Id.
29. 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
30. Id. at 754.
31. Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet 13: Employment Relationship Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T LAB. (July 2008), https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/whd/fact-sheets/13-flsa-employment-relationship [https://perma.cc/
E6T9-W9GC] (listing seven factors Supreme Court has considered in past, which
reflect six factors from Real and one concerning “degree of independent business
organization and operation”).
32. See Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (establishing balancing test for deciding whether
workers are independent contractors or employees).
33. 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985).
34. 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979); see also DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1382–83
(“Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit . . . refined the test for
‘employee’ status originally set forth initially by the Supreme Court in Rutherford.
This test lists six specific factors for determining whether a worker is an “employee”. . . . We now adopt it as the standard for determining ‘employee’ status
under the FLSA, and we will proceed to analyze the district court’s decision in
relation thereto.” (citations omitted)). The Third Circuit adopted the named ver-
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court adopted this version of the test for two reasons: (1) it closely resembled the standard set by the Supreme Court in Rutherford, and (2) the
Ninth Circuit successfully used this test.35 In Donovan, the Third Circuit
further noted that, when analyzing the “circumstances of the whole activity,” it should also be considered “whether, as a matter of economic reality,
the individuals ‘are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.’ ”36 This is a pseudo-step seven and an inverse analysis of Real’s
original step six; it attempts to gauge how much each side relies upon the
other for conducting business.
Whenever a dispute over worker classification arises in the Third Circuit, the court will always employ the economic realities test.37 Courts do
not permit employers to circumvent the application of the test by binding
their workers to a false designation through contractual obligation.38 As
was the case in Verma, employers will sometimes have their workers sign an
agreement explicitly stating that they are serving as an independent contractor.39 The FLSA works to trump employment contracts like these
when they fail to meet the minimum standards of the Act.40 These baseline standards cannot be waived even with the written consent of the employee.41 Legislators recognized the unequal bargaining power in an
employee–employer relationship and included compulsory standards to
protect rightful employees from insufficient wages and excessive hours.42
sion of the Ninth Circuit’s test, but the six listed factors were identical to those set
forth in Real. See DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1382–83.
35. See DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1382–83 (discussing implementation of test);
id. at 1383 (“The Sureway Cleaners test has been previously cited with approval by
this court in dicta.”)
36. Id. at 1382 (first internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Donovan v.
Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981)) (adopting additional element of overall analysis that courts tended to consider in conjunction with sixfactor test).
37. See id. (adopting economic realities test as precedent).
38. Griffith, supra note 11, at 594 (“In a similar vein to the above, the FLSA’s
legislative history compellingly portrays that businesses’ self-serving labels and contractual terms are not relevant to the FLSA’s reach . . . . The Congress that enacted the FLSA feared that business formalities would unintentionally push some
businesses out of the FLSA’s regulatory zone. Thus, the mere labeling, or existence of a contractual term indicating that a worker is an ‘independent contractor,’ carries no weight in the determination of whether a FLSA-recognized
employment relationship exists.” (footnote omitted)).
39. See Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting all
contracts included clause stating dancers were independent contractors).
40. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (providing guidance on rationale behind FLSA’s minimum mandates).
41. Id. at 707.
42. See id. at 707 n. 18 (discussing legislative debate about unprotected working population); see also Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 32
(Cal. 2018) (“Wage and hour statutes and wage orders were adopted in recognition of the fact that individual workers generally possess less bargaining power
than a hiring business and that workers’ fundamental need to earn income for
their families’ survival may lead them to accept work for substandard wages or
working conditions.”).
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The court does not give any weight to the text of a contract in determining
the true role of a worker, but this has not been incorporated into the
balancing test.43
The final determination as to whether an individual is an employee or
independent contractor is undoubtedly a legal conclusion, but this conclusion is heavily fact-based.44 As was the case in the relationship between the
class of dancers and their purported employer in Verma, the courts will
probe and rely on very specific facts about the nature of the relationship
that exists between two parties, input these facts into the relevant test factors, and attempt to reach a conclusion that most closely, and fairly, resembles the “economic reality” of the relationship.
II.

FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY,

AND

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In 2013, Priya Verma filed a class action suit against her employer,
Castor, alleging a failure to pay minimum and overtime wages under the
FLSA and analogous state laws.45 Verma’s class consisted of twenty-two
women who had worked at some point as dancers at Castor’s adult entertainment club in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: the Penthouse Club.46
Castor’s contended that these dancers were independent contractors,
both in fact and by contract, and therefore not entitled to these wages.47
In a decisive victory for Verma, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania entered final judgment on a jury verdict, awarding the
class more than $4.5 million.48 The district court concluded that, due in
large part to the club’s significant control over the dancers and its
“dominat[ion] [of] the key levers driving the dancers’ opportunity for
profit,” the facts lopsidedly weighed in favor of classifying the dancers as
employees.49
The case arrived at the Third Circuit after appeal by Castor.50 The
Third Circuit, in applying the economic realities test adopted in DialAmerica, began with a thorough analysis of the economic relations between
Castor and the class of dancers.51 The Third Circuit found that five of the
43. Verma, 937 F.3d at 229 (noting inquiry into whether worker signed agreement stating they are an independent contractor is not factored into analysis because purpose of FLSA is to protect workers by overriding contractual relations).
44. See, e.g., Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1991)
(discussing importance of fact findings in determination of nature of working
relationship).
45. Verma, 937 F.3d at 225.
46. See id. at 226.
47. Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., No. 13–3034, 2014 WL 2957453, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. June 30, 2014), aff’d, 937 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2019).
48. Verma, 937 F.3d at 226.
49. Verma, 2014 WL 2957453, at *10.
50. Verma, 937 F.3d at 224.
51. Id. at 229 (“Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the FLSA or PMWA is a mixed question of fact and law. . . . The fact
component is the combination of disputed and undisputed facts that comprise the
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six factors heavily favored the dancers being characterized as employees
under the FLSA.52 First, the court found that, despite some minor choices
exercised by the dancers—such as the number of hours worked, which
shifts to take, and the ability to accept and reject specific customers—
Castor had “overwhelming” control over the manner in which work was
performed.53 This control extended to determining shift times, dictating
the dancers’ appearances, selecting the songs, and especially setting the
price on everything within the club.54 Second, the court explained that
the dancers’ control over their personal profits and losses based on their
own personal efforts did not constitute “managerial skill” discussed in the
second factor of the economic realities test.55 These managerial skills are
more entrepreneurial than “hustle” or “initiative” that a dancer or another
worker in a generic employer–employee relationship may exhibit.56 In its
discussion of factor four of the test, the Third Circuit, in accordance with
established precedent, dismissed Castor’s argument that “dancing skills”
could be considered “special skills” that would indicate a worker’s ability
to take up business by themselves.57
The Third Circuit decided factors three and six weighed in favor of
treating the dancers as employees without much difficulty. The court
found the minimal “investment” in stage time by the dancers paled in
comparison to Castor’s investment in the business of the club.58 Castor’s
investment included maintenance of the premises, licensing fees, food
and alcohol, and beyond.59 Finally, Castor essentially conceded that the
economic relations between the worker and the alleged employer.” (citation
omitted)).
52. Id. at 232.
53. Id. at 230 (“On balance, the control factor weighs strongly in favor ‘employee’ status.”).
54. Id. The control analysis included less concrete facts as well the way the
club “closely reviewed their attendance, appearance, demeanor, and customer service,” which could result in fines for the dancers. Id. at 225.
55. Id. at 231. The dancer earnings fluctuated only based on the amount of
their tips. They did not have control over most of the revenue drivers like the rates
for private dances or food prices. Id. at 225.
56. Id.; see also McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th
Cir. 2016) (stating courts have almost “universally rejected” argument that dancers
control their opportunities for losses and profits because they can “hustle” to increase tips and dance fees); Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th
Cir. 1993) (deciding night clubs play more significant roles in increasing dancer
tips than dancers hustle or initiative).
57. Verma, 937 F.3d at 231 (“We refuse to recognize these as ‘special skills’
that weigh in favor of independent contractor status. Although we have not drawn
a bright line between ‘special’ and other skills for purposes of our six-factor test,
we do not believe ‘appearance,’ ‘social skills,’ and ‘hygiene’ qualify.”); see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining general set
of skills required for manager to effectively manage are not “specialized skills” because they are abilities common to all effective managers).
58. Verma, 937 F.3d at 231.
59. See id. The only “investment” by the dancers cited by Castor was their
stage-rental fees each shift. Id.
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dancers are an integral part of their business.60 The court credited Castor
for not attempting to argue that they were drawing customers with their
food and drink offerings.61 Not every factor, however, was decided so easily in the dancers’ favor.
The fifth factor, addressing the degree of permanence of the working
relationship, came down on Castor’s side, supporting an independent contractor classification. The court recognized that the dancers, as a class,
make up a particularly transient group.62 According to the court, the average dancer worked only 14 of the possible 109 workweeks under examination at Castor’s club.63 Additionally, none of the twenty-two dancers in
the class worked more than forty hours per week for Castor.64 This suggests that the dancers likely take advantage of the fact that they are free to
work at other venues, including any of Castor’s local competitors.65 The
Third Circuit agreed with the district court by finding this factor favored
Castor.66 Nevertheless, the court downplayed any possible conflict in the
final determination by citing prior Fourth and Fifth Circuit opinions that
assigned very little weight to this specific factor under similar
circumstances.67
The Third Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court and sustained the jury verdict.68 It found that after a holistic assessment, in which
five of the six considered factors went in favor of the plaintiffs, this case
was “not a hard one.”69 The one factor in favor of Castor did “not cut so
strongly in that direction as to come close to outweighing the other five,”
and it stated these dancers were not independent contractors as a matter
of “economic reality.”70
60. Id. at 232 (“The last factor weighs clearly in favor of an employee relationship. Castor markets the Club as an ‘adult gentleman’s club.’ Its primary offering
to customers is topless female dancers . . . .”).
61. Id. The court wryly commented that, “[t]o its credit, Castor does not argue that anyone comes to the Club for the food, drinks, or any reason other than
to see the dancers.” Id.
62. See id. at 231.
63. Id. at 231.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 231–32.
66. Id. at 232.
67. See McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2016)
(downplaying degree of permanence factor in challenges brought by exotic dancers due to nature of their work); Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328
(5th Cir. 1993) (reasoning although the dancers have impermanent relationship
with club in question, this factor is not determinative).
68. Verma, 937 F.3d at 233.
69. Id. at 232 (“[W]e easily conclude the dancers were ‘dependent upon the
business to which they render service.’” (quoting Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949
F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991))).
70. Id.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Although the circuit court appropriately applied the existing economic realities test in reaching a positive result for the class of dancers,
this decision demonstrates serious flaws with the test and, more broadly,
illustrates the impact of the lack of guidance from the FLSA on courts.71
It is unclear which factors a court will focus most of its analysis on and
which factors it will disregard with little more than a mention.72 These
inconsistencies in the application of an otherwise well-developed test result in difficulties for businesses that genuinely seek to operate with an
independent workforce for legitimate reasons.73 It is not only businesses
that fall victim to this uncertainty, but also workers who benefit from the
freedom and flexibility that comes with working independently outside
the scope of a traditional employee–employer relationship.74
The Third Circuit in Verma produced positive results both legally and
policy-wise for the class of dancers, especially for a profession that has historically been taken advantage of by their employers.75 Other circuit
courts have issued precedential opinions in cases involving employers unlawfully denying the right to a minimum wage and compensated overtime
to classes of dancers—much like the class in Verma.76 The Third Circuit in
Verma accurately applied and conformed with other circuit courts’ reasoning in these similarly situated cases. Nevertheless, courts should not have
to conduct an elaborate balancing test in order to simply classify a worker
under an already existing statute.
The main problem for courts, businesses, and workers originates from
the lack of clarity in the FLSA. The area of labor and employment has
71. Carlson, supra note 19, at 298–99 (emphasizing difficulty courts have in
relaying FLSA guidance).
72. Id. at 335 (expressing concern about unpredictability of judicial decision
resulting from ambiguous working relationships and lack of clear guidance).
73. Margot Roosevelt, Are You An Employee or a Contractor? Carpenters, Strippers
and Dog Walkers Now Face That Question, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dynamex-contractors-20190223-story.html
[permalink unavailable] (discussing how law-abiding business owners are struggling to interpret employer–employee relationship).
74. Id. (discussing barber who started working as independent contractor because it allowed them to take college classes while working, but now, as an employee, makes less money per hour and are required to work nine-hour days).
75. See Erin Mulvaney & Andrew Wallender, Strippers Winning Employee Status
Challenges Gig Economy’s Norms, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 21, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/strippers-winning-employee-statuschallenges-gig-economys-norms [https://perma.cc/J9C7-HYE4] (“Exotic dancers
generally don’t get paychecks. . . . And they’re not guaranteed anything. They
have no rights to minimum wage or overtime. They can’t sue for sexual harassment or discrimination, or form a union. That’s because the strip club business is
typically built on classifying its workers as contractors rather than employees.”).
76. See, e.g., McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir.
2016); Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993).
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seen an increase over time in rules and statutory guidance.77 A greater
number of codified standards for people to reference usually results in
more clarity and predictability.78 Federal labor and employment law is
one of the more robust statutory areas beyond the FLSA, with crucial statutes such as the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), and numerous others that regulate workplaces. It
is incumbent upon the legislature to rectify this problem with clearer statutory guidelines.79 The guidelines do not necessarily have to be purely
definitional. It may be difficult to succinctly describe or differentiate between the traits an “employee” may exhibit as opposed to an “independent
contractor” in a few lines of statutory text, but as it stands now, the FLSA
provides nothing more than a circular description of “employee.”80 This
difficulty is precisely why the courts, and those directly affected by the
laws, deserve additional guidance.
Some states within the Third Circuit have been tackling this issue
themselves and could serve as a valuable guide for reform at the federal
level. Specifically, New Jersey aggressively tackled employee misclassification issues with a spate of new bills in 2019 and 2020.81 In particular, a
New Jersey bill introduced in November 2019 attempted to clarify the distinction between employee and independent contractor by implementing
a default rule.82 If New Jersey legislature passed the bill, all individuals
permitted or suffered to work would be considered employees for the purposes of state employment laws.83 To consider a worker as an independent contractor, the bill requires that the worker meet three factors
(otherwise known as the “ABC” test):
77. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 378 (2002) (“Until the mid1960s, the [National Labor Relations Act] and the Fair Labor Standards Act were
the only two federal statutes that comprehensively regulated the workplace. That
situation has changed dramatically as Congress has adopted a host of more recent
employment-related statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382 (1985)
(“[A] rule has a hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate response.”). Unlike legal standards, which include some level of judicial discretion, parties may
easily predict the outcome in the event of a violation of a rule. See id. at 382–83.
79. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 368 (“Clear rules and equitable coverage
demand more than outdated nineteenth century notions of status.”).
80. See id. at 296 (addressing circular definition of “employee” in FLSA).
81. See Gene Marks, New Jersey Laws Will Make It Harder for Small Businesses to
Use Independent Contractors, PHILA. INQUIRER, https://www.inquirer.com/economy/
new-jersey-independent-contractors-law-small-business-20200226.html [https://
perma.cc/J4Q2-UF6J] (last updated Feb. 26, 2020).
82. See S. 4204, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2019).
83. See id. (“[T]he bill provides that, for the purposes of all State employment
laws, individuals who are suffered or permitted to work are employees, not independent contractors, and are subject to the provisions of those laws, and entitled
to all remedies for any violations of those laws . . . .”).
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a. The individual has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction over the performance of the service, both
under contract of service and in fact; and
b. The individual’s service is either outside the usual course of
the business for which such service is performed, or the work is
performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise
for which such service is performed; and
c. The individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business.84
Obvious parallels exist between the ABC test and the economic realities test. The proposed New Jersey model, however, provides far more effective guidance to courts than the current state of the FLSA. The default
classification as a basis for all employment relationships not only provides
a level of clarity and certainty for the employee and employer, but also
forces the employee and employer to be aware of the exceptions. Additionally, the three factors are available—plain in the statute—and are
more succinct than the economic realities test. The New Jersey model is
also superior in application. Even if an employer is aware of the factors in
an economic realities analysis, the result remains difficult to predict because of the lack of clarity in the balancing of the test.85 Conversely, the
ABC test clearly states that employer must affirmatively prove all three factors for the “independent contractor” designation to be valid.”86
States within the Third Circuit have received push back for some of
these attempts at reform, but they are generally far less radical than recent
changes in other states.87 The California Supreme Court set a new test in
April 2018 in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court88 that assumes
any worker is an employee if (1) their job is central to a company’s core
business, or (2) their boss directs how work is accomplished.89 This immediately altered the classification of a massive number of workers across industries from construction workers and truckers to coders and
hairdressers.90 Even if it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would alter
the FLSA with a sweeping decision, Congress could still examine state-level
changes and craft a better federal policy. Statutory changes like that of
New Jersey can serve as a guidepost for legislators seeking to effectuate
change.
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing impact of discretion in application of test).
86. S. 4204, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2019).
87. For further discussion about recent attempts to reform in other states, see
supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
88. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
89. See id. at 40.
90. See Roosevelt, supra note 73 (analyzing impact of Dynamex decision on California workers).
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IMPACT

The decision in Verma resulted in overwhelming positive change for
the class of dancers. Data shows that, since the decision, dancers have
been leading a recent charge against strip clubs for employees’ rights beyond the dancers who brought suit.91 Hundreds of workers have sued alleging misclassification, and although few have made it to trial, dancers
have often emerged victorious—including three appellate court victories.92 These cases, including Verma, may serve as a leading indicator for
millions of gig economy workers taking up the same battle.
The gig economy continues to grow in the United States according to
every traceable metric, though new and complex job classifications added
each year make it more difficult to track.93 Multiple research firms have
confirmed the rise. The ADP Research Institute reports that in the past
ten years (2010–2019), the share of gig workers in organizations has
grown by 15%, now registering at one in six workers in a given organization.94 That means there are six million more gig workers than a decade
ago, and these metrics do not include seasonal or side jobs.95 The Brookings Institute has looked specifically at these more difficult to trace workers by analyzing the “rides and rooms” industries.96 Brookings identified
millions of “nonemployer firms” that comprise of individuals earning a
living by themselves through apps like Uber and Airbnb.97 The number
of these “businesses” has risen to nearly twenty-four million in 2014.98
This rise has implications within the Third Circuit, as the Philadelphia
metro area has seen a rise of over 30% in the “rides” industry and 6% in
91. See Mulvaney & Wallender, supra note 75 (“Hundreds of dancers have
sought to change this [independent contractor] model, outlined in a surging of
lawsuits in recent years. The cases—filed at a rate of one every four days so far [in
2019]—argue such common practices leave workers vulnerable . . . .”).
92. Id.
93. Ian Hathaway & Mark Muro, Tracking the Gig Economy: New Numbers,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-thegig-economy-new-numbers/#cancel [https://perma.cc/G85R-9FQM] (discussing
complexity and challenge of tracking expansion of gig economy).
94. ADP Research Institute Report Reveals the Gig Workforce is Filling a Void in the
Tight Labor Market, ADP RES. INST. (Feb. 4, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/adp-research-institute-report-reveals-the-gig-workforce-isfilling-a-void-in-the-tight-labor-market-300998593.html [https://perma.cc/KMM7SWCW].
95. Greg Iacurci, The Gig Economy Has Ballooned By 6 Million People Since 2010.
Financial Worries May Follow, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/04/gig-economy-grows-15percent-over-past-decade-adp-report.html [https://perma.cc/5TFD8SWX] (last updated Feb. 4, 2020, 1:02 PM).
96. See Hathaway & Muro, supra note 93 (predicting successful litigation in
exotic dancer cases may lead to litigation in similarly situated industries).
97. See id. (determining most “businesses” in rides and rooms industries are
sole proprietors).
98. Id.
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the “rooms” industry.99 Additionally, the Pittsburgh metro area has seen a
rise of 85% and 11% in those industries respectively.100
Workers in both industries likely face the next frontier of employment rights that dancers currently wage against strip clubs. In fact, some
attorneys who have succeeded in these strip club misclassification suits
have turned their focus on the Lyfts and Instacarts of the world.101 Uber
carefully crafts their working relationships with their contractors around
FLSA standards and likely has been framing these relationships around
decisions like Verma for guidance on circuit court reasoning. Uber has
held strong in its belief that their drivers are independent contractors because the drivers have the freedom to decide where and when to use their
platform.102 They also stress the fact that drivers have the freedom to
work for competitors and must provide their own car.103 These points
clearly mirror the economic realities test and demonstrates Uber’s strategy
for taking on challengers in the courts.
So far, the Third Circuit has demonstrated a willingness to carefully
scrutinize gig employment relationships. In March 2020, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded a district court ruling that granted summary
judgment in favor of Uber.104 The court found genuine issues of material
fact regarding the economic realities test, specifically pertaining to the
“right to control” and “opportunity for profit and loss” factors.105 Concerns about these specific factors draw direct comparisons to Verma, indicating that these cases are more alike than they are different. These
actions by the Third Circuit provide a valuable glimpse into how these
cases may proceed for Uber and many other gig companies, but deep uncertainty remains for both sides. The FLSA’s ambiguities will continue to
create a vacuum of uncertainty for workers and industries that will only
worsen as novel economic relations continue to grow and play a larger
role in the economy.
Jack F. O’Connor

99. Id. The “Philadelphia metro area” for purposes of this research included
parts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Lauren Smiley, What Strippers Can Teach Uber, MATTER (Apr. 20,
2015), https://medium.com/matter/what-strippers-can-teach-uber-1f5b15e5b427
[https://perma.cc/87SK-L57Y].
102. See Jacob Passy, Uber Doesn’t Want Its Drivers to Be Employees—Here’s Why
That Matters, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/uber-doesnt-want-its-drivers-to-be-employees-heres-why-that-matters-20
17-11-13 [https://perma.cc/HK98-TWM3] (explaining Uber’s reasoning for classifying workers as independent contractors).
103. Id.
104. See Razak v. Uber Tech., Inc., 951 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020).
105. Id. at 145–47.
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